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In 2010, the EU Council established a multi-annual policy cycle in order to 1)  define priorities 
in the EU-wide “fight against serious international and organized crime,” on this basis 2) 
develop and 3) implement appropriate interventions to tackle the prioritized crime 
phenomena and 4)  evaluate the results achieved in order to identify a new set of priorities 
for the following cycle. After a two-year trial cycle, the first policy-cycle started in 2013 and 
is due to last until 2017 (Europol, 2013: 9). 
This policy cycle is a major innovation because it embodies a more rational, efficient and 
accountable policy-making, in which crime control goals are set on the basis of evidence and 
public arguments and outcomes are objectively evaluated ex-post. Still today in the field of 
crime control it is common to set goals on the basis of emergencies, or the gut feelings of 
national policy leaders and to carry out no serious evaluation of policy outcomes (den Boer, 
2006; Ratzel, 2013; Fijnaut 2014). 
The cycle draws from Europol’s Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA), 
which recommends the criminal activities and actors to be prioritized. A praiseworthy 
innovation of the SOCTA is its focus on the harms resulting from crime, which are considered 
a key criterion for establishing policy priorities. However, as argued more in detail below, the 
assessment of the harm should be carried out in a more systematic, transparent and open-
minded way in order to meet the expectations raised in the policy cycle. 
1. The EU policy cycle on serious international and organized crime 
The cycle consists of four phases, which are described as follows in Europol’s 2013 SOCTA: 
• Step 1: SOCTA— the Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment, developed by 
Europol delivers a set of recommendations based on an in-depth analysis of the major 
crime threats facing the EU. 
• Step 2: Policy-setting and decision making— The Council of Justice and Home Affairs 
Ministers uses the recommendations of the SOCTA to define its priorities for the next 
four years. MASP - Multi-Annual Strategic Action Plans will be developed from the 
priorities in order to define the strategic goals for combating each priority threat (2013). 
These projects will set out yearly operational action plans (OAPs) to combat the priority 
threats. The first plans will be developed during 2013 to become operational in 2014. 
• Step 3: Implementation and monitoring of annual OAP’s on the basis of the MASPs 
using the framework of  EMPACT (European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal 
Threats). COSI [the Standing Committee for the EU Internal Security, N.o.A.] invites the 
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relevant MS and EU agencies to integrate the actions developed in the OAPs into their 
planning and strategy. 
• Step 4: Review and assessment—the effectiveness of the OAPs and their impact on 
the priority threat will be reviewed. In the meantime, Europol continuously engages in 
horizon scanning to identify new threats and trends. In 2015, an interim threat 
assessment (SOCTA) will be prepared by Europol to evaluate, monitor and adjust (if 
required) the effort in tackling the priority threats (Europol, 2013: 9). 
The new policy cycle is made possible by the new competencies attributed to EU institutions 
in the area of crime control by the Treaty of Lisbon, which became effective on 1 December 
2009 (Fijnaut, 2014). Within the new constitutional framework established in the amended 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the fight against (serious and organized) 
crime is considered a shared responsibility of the EU and its Member States (MS), thus 
becoming part of what was, until the Treaty of Lisbon, referred to as the First Pillar. 
2. The scope of application 
Despite the original focus on organized crime, the new competencies can be applied to a 
large spectrum of criminality. In fact, the EU never provided an official definition of 
organized crime and the latest Europol’s SOCTA (2013: 42) merely refers to the definition of 
a criminal organization put forward by the Framework Decision on Organised Crime of 
October, 24, 2008. This is very broad, as it defines a “criminal organization” as a “structured 
association established over a period of time, of more than two persons acting in concert 
with a view to committing offences which are punishable with the deprivation of liberty or a 
detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty, to obtain, 
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit” (European Council, 2008b: 42). 
This definition means that any group from the Sicilian Cosa Nostra to a burglars’ clique, from 
Al Qaeda to a youth gang engaging in assaults, can be considered a form of organized crime. 
Since the beginning of the present century, moreover, the EU institutions have progressively 
accompanied, or even tout court substituted, the expression “organized crime” with that of 
“serious crime.”1 Although the latter expression has also never been precisely defined, there 
is no doubt that it is even broader than organized crime. As Europol (2003: 43) again states 
in its latest SOCTA, “serious crime refers to criminal activity deemed worth reporting on, 
which does not meet the OCG definition set out in the 2008 Framework decision. De facto it 
also concerns lone actors or individual actions.” 
                                                          
1 In 2002, the European Council set up Eurojust, a judicial cooperative body, “with a view to 
reinforcing the fight against serious crime” (European Council, 2002) and, in 2009, it enlarged 
Europol’s mission  “to support and strengthen action by the competent authorities of  the Member 
States and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating organised crime, terrorism and 
other forms of serious crime affecting two or more Member States” (European Council, 2009, article 
3). The 2009 “Stockholm Programme,” the third EU multi-annual programme to put an "area of 
freedom, security and justice” in place, also called for “protection against serious and organized 
crime” (European Council, 2010).  
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Given the very broad scope of serious crime, it is legitimate to ask which forms of crime, if 
any, are excluded  from EU competencies. Article 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU 2008), as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, authorizes the European 
Parliament and the Council to establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal 
offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border 
dimension. Accordingly, serious crime results “from the nature or impact of such offences or 
from a special need to combat them on a common basis” (European Council, 2008a). The 
article also lists the areas of crime identified as serious, on the basis of the above-mentioned 
criteria: “terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and 
children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, 
counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised crime.” A final clause of 
Article 83(1) states that other areas of crime can be added by the Council by a unanimous 
decision after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament (ibid.). 
Judging by the list of crimes selected by Europol (2013: 39) in its 2013 SOCTA, the treaty list 
is not considered exclusive.  SOCTA recommends that  the counterfeiting of goods with an 
impact of public health and safety and a specific type of VAT fraud, the Missing Trader Intra 
Community fraud, are also recognized as key threats. The report also presents two other 
activities not included in the treaty list, environmental crime and energy fraud, as emerging 
threats. Perpetuating the long-lasting conceptual confusion concerning organized crime (see 
Paoli and Vander Beken, 2014), moreover, the latest Europol’s SOCTA uses the latter 
expression to refer to both activities and actors: in fact, it speaks both of “organized crime 
groups (OCGs)” and “serious and organized crime areas of activities (SOC areas)” (ibid.: 42). 
3. Europol’S SOCTA and the methodology to assess the harms of crime 
The extent to which the Multi-Annual Strategic Action Plans, which are being developed by 
the European Council of Justice and Home Affairs, and COSI will follow up on Europol’s 
recommendations is still unclear. There is no doubt, however, that Europol has been 
entrusted with a major responsibility in identifying EU-wide crime control priorities in its 
SOCTAs.  
Previous Europol’s Organized Crime Threat Assessments (OCTAs) were variously criticized by 
academic scholars and this editorial does not intend to repeat such criticisms, many of which 
were justified (Van Duyne and Vander Beken, 2009 and Zoutendijk, 2010). Even Europol’s 
former Director Max-Peter Ratzel (2013) admits that in 2005, Europol did not have the 
necessary human and logistical resources or the fine-tuned methodology and 
comprehensive data to shift smoothly from a backward-looking Organized Crime Situation 
Report to a forward-looking, strategic OCTA. Ultimately, these deficiencies were largely not 
Europol’s  fault but rather reflected the insufficient support received by Europol from the EU 
central institutions and the MS and the poor intelligence of the MS’s law enforcement 
agencies. It is undoubtedly positive that Europol (2013: 42-46) has sought the cooperation of 
three academics for its latest SOCTA and published (parts of) the latter’s methodology in an 
annex.  
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An innovative and very positive element of this new methodology is its focus on the 
impact—and thus the harm—of crime. This new focus reflects the recent emphasis on 
serious crime, a concept that resonates with harm (Dorn, 2009), and specifically the 
emphasis on the impact of the offences placed by above-mentioned Article 83 TFEU to 
justify the establishment of minimum rules concerning the definition of EU-wide criminal 
offences and sanctions. Even more fundamentally, the harm “caused” by a criminal activity 
is, with few exceptions, considered crucial in the legal doctrine to justifying the very 
criminalization of such an activity and the assignment of penalties (e.g., Ashworth, 2006: 30-
39; for a review of this debate, see Paoli and Greenfield, 2013). 
In its SOCTA methodology, Europol (2013: 43) mentions that it uses “effects indicators to 
measure the effect that OCGs and crime areas have on EU society.” Europol further adds 
that “the effects of OCG activities can be assessed as high, medium or low on any or all of 
the dimensions including physical and psychological, political, financial and economic, social 
technological and environmental.”(ibid.). However, Europol provides no further indication 
on what these indicators consist of or how it  assigns a high, medium or low score.  
Given this methodological inaccuracy, it is hardly surprising that the analysis of the harms 
associated with the criminal activities is disappointing. The 2013 SOCTA  merely provides a 
list of banalities that are partially contradicted by the results of empirical research and 
sometimes even by common sense. Furthermore, Europol’s analysis makes no distinction 
between the harms caused by the activities and the harms and costs of the policy 
interventions carried out to tackle the activities themselves.   
4. Europol’s assessment of the harms of drug trafficking 
In the case of drug trafficking for example, the harms are described as follows:  
Drugs production and trafficking are among  the most profitable types of organised 
crime. Violence, public health issues, a high number of deaths and feelings of insecurity 
are all linked to the trade in drugs. Prevention and harm reduction campaigns cost 
millions of Euros to MS. OCGs continue to strive to minimise costs during the drug 
production process, which entails serious risks for drug users. Synthetics and new 
psychoactive substances (NPS) are produced in complex processes lacking control 
mechanisms; low quality products are used as precursors for synthetics or cutting agents 
for heroin; pesticides and insecticides are intensively used to maximise cannabis harvest 
yields (Europol, 2013: 19). 
Contrary to Europol’s assessment, a number of studies have shown that the violence directly 
associated with drug production and trafficking in Europe is much more limited than usually 
assumed. In a study of the harms associated with cocaine trafficking in Europe, for example, 
Paoli, Greenfield and Zoutendijk (2013) concluded—on the basis of an analysis of all major 
criminal investigations of the Belgian Federal Police and interviews of 20 convicted 
traffickers—that there was no evidence of murders associated with cocaine trafficking in 
Belgium for the period considered. The only  deaths associated with it were those of the 
“body packers,” killed by the inadvertent explosion of the cocaine balls they were carrying in 
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the bodies (see also Pearson and Hobbs, 2001). On the basis of their scales of severity and 
incidence, Paoli et al. (2013) thus ranked the lethal harms resulting from cocaine trafficking 
in Belgium as “catastrophic” but “rare” and gave them a “medium/high priority.” Less 
serious harms resulting from the violence associated with cocaine trafficking occurred more 
often, but given their lower severity, all these harms, with one exception, were given a low 
priority. Similar conclusions emerged from the assessment of the violence associated with 
cocaine trafficking in the Netherlands (Paoli and Kersten, 2013) and cannabis production in 
Belgium (Decorte et al., 2013). 
The “serious risks for drug users” that Europol draws from the current production process of  
synthetics and new psychoactive substances, as well as the “ lack of control mechanisms” 
and “low quality products” are also the result of policy choices. It is thus hardly justifiable to 
assign these harms to the criminal activity itself and present them simply as a reason for 
prioritizing the latter.  
The statement “pesticides and insecticides are intensively used to maximize cannabis 
harvest yields” from Europol’s text should also be more nuanced. In web surveys, many 
small-scale  growers report  that they started growing cannabis in order to ensure they were 
smoking a natural product, and that they hence use no pesticides (Decorte, 2011). Large-
scale growers do use pesticides, but there is no consistent evidence they use these 
substances in more dangerous amounts, concentration or types than, for example,  growers 
of tomatoes or peppers (e.g., Decorte et al. 2011). Moreover, if cannabis were legal, it would 
be much easier to ensure quality controls. 
To my knowledge, there is also limited support for stating that “feelings of insecurity are 
…linked to the trade in drugs” (Europol 2013: 19). Drug production and wholesale trafficking, 
which is what Europol presumably focuses on, are mostly invisible and thus hardly likely to 
cause public alarm. Only in the Netherlands does the production of synthetic drugs and 
cannabis increasingly occur in  local cities and, according to some observers (Fijnaut, 2013, 
personal communication), it  has a negative impact on feeling of safety.  Aggressive street 
dealing can also cause widespread feelings of insecurity but most large European cities 
prohibit such behaviors.  
Contrary to what Europol (2013: 19) states, the “millions of Euros” “prevention and harm 
reduction campaigns cost … to MS” cannot be considered a cost of drug trafficking itself. 
Rather, they are the costs of policies developed to tackle the demand, and not  the supply, of 
drugs. Counterfactual reasoning  proves this point: if drug trafficking were “abolished by 
law,” i.e., legalized, the money to be invested in prevention and harm reduction campaigns 
would be bound to increase rather than diminish (see also Levi et al., 2013: 11 and Levi and 
Burrows, 2008). 
The overall impression of the paragraph on the harms of drug trafficking is that Europol has 
had difficulties in identifying the harms associated with this criminal activity and did not 
want to admit that most of these harms are the result of policy choices. This notion is, a key 
and consistent finding of the assessments of the harms associated with cocaine trafficking in 
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Belgium and the Netherlands and cannabis production in Belgium (Paoli et al. 2013, Paoli 
and Kersten, 2013 and Decorte et al., 2013). European law enforcement agencies and policy-
makers should be more honest with their constituencies, admit this point and explain why 
the production and distribution of some psychoactive substances, such as cannabis, cocaine 
and synthetic drugs,  were prohibited in the first place: namely, to reduce their 
consumption. It might well be that the policy is effective because the harms “caused” by 
policy on the supply side are offset by the harms prevented on the demand side through the 
criminalization of cocaine. However, this empirical assessment has so far never been 
attempted.  
5. Europol’s assessment of the harms of human smuggling 
Even more controversial is Europol’s (2013: 23) assessment of the harms associated with 
human smuggling or, as Europol puts is, the facilitation of illegal immigration:  
Facilitated migrants can suffer severe physical, psychological and social harm. Over the 
past few years, there have been an increasing number of reports of migrants losing their 
lives during journeys. Attempts to cross the sea or “blue” borders are particularly 
dangerous and have claimed the lives of many migrants. Emerging facilitation 
techniques are very risky and include clandestine entry in refrigerated vehicles and 
tankers or concealment in plastic bags sealed with tape. Some facilitators use violence 
to intimidate migrants. Upon arrival in their destination countries, migrants suffer 
further due to their illegal status and lack of access to public services such as education, 
housing and health care. 
Here, Europol blatantly obscures the fact that most of the harms associated with human 
smuggling are not primarily the fault of the “bad” traffickers but are largely induced by the 
EU restrictive immigration policies, as clearly shown by numerous tragedies in the 
Mediterranean Sea and along the Bulgarian-Turkish border. Why is an increasing number of 
“migrants losing lives during their journeys” and why are the “emerging facilitation 
techniques … very risky”? Let’s be honest: This is because EU MS have intensified controls, 
built up fences and high walls, and often instruct their coast guard vessels not to rescue the 
unsafe boats containing hundreds of migrants (Economist, 2013; Gatti, 2013). 
The EU and its MS’ wish  to control migration flows is perfectly legitimate: European 
countries have the right—and, according to many of their citizens, even the duty—to 
prevent hundreds of thousands of Third World people from flooding our job markets and 
taking advantage of our welfare systems. However, as thousands of undocumented migrants 
keep on trying to enter the EU with the hope of having a better life and a considerable 
portion might be entitled to asylum, it is also the duty of the EU and its MS to develop 
migration and asylum policies that recognize migrants’ basic human rights, including the 
right to asylum and to minimize the harms resulting from these policy choices and any 
resulting illegal activities. 
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Conclusion: The potential and challenges of assessing the harms of crime 
As these examples show, the focus on harm, if developed properly and honestly, obliges 
policy-makers to justify their policy choices on the basis of evidence and to envisage policies 
that can minimize the harms of both the criminal activities themselves and the policy 
enacted to control them. Given the potential scope of harm assessment, the question is 
rather if the latter—and thus the identification of priorities in crime control—should be 
entirely entrusted to Europol or instead also involve higher-ranking policy-makers. As a law 
enforcement agency, Europol has the task to enforce the laws  and related policies, not to 
question them—and this may well explain Europol’s restraint in the assessment of crime 
harms in the latest SOCTA. As seen earlier, the assessment of the harms of crime, if it 
includes the determination of the causes of the harms, may well lead to a re-assessment and 
eventually re-focus of some control policies—and is ultimately the competence of policy-
makers.  
Assessing the harms of any activity is a daunting exercise that has to overcome considerable 
conceptual and technical challenges. It is also tricky, as such an evaluation cannot be done 
through scientific means alone but necessarily also reflects the social norms of a community 
(Paoli and Greenfield, 2013)— another reason why policy-makers should ultimately be 
involved. It is a normative, and not a purely empirical, decision to establish if the harms 
associated with drug use are to be considered a consequence of drug production and 
trafficking or if the death of an offender has to be weighed in the same way as the death of a 
victim. In a recent article, Greenfield and Paoli (2013) have developed a harm assessment 
framework addressing most of these conceptual and technical challenges and clearly 
distinguishing between the empirical assessments that can be made almost value-free by 
scientists and intelligence analysts and those that are normative and should thus be left to 
policy-makers An alternative, albeit less complete, route is to assess the costs of different 
criminal activities, considering monetary costs a proxy of harms (e.g., Levi et al., 2013). 
The methodological difficulties of assessing  harms are probably an important reason  why 
the UK Serious and Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) gave up its attempts to assess and 
compare the harms associated with different criminal activities, after publishing two 
different conceptual frameworks (SOCA, 2008 and 2010: 25).2 SOCA’s attempts were meant 
to fulfil  “the overarching aim” set by the 2008 UK Organised Crime Control Strategy: 
“namely, achieving a tangible and lasting reduction in the harm caused to the UK by 
organised crime” (SOCA, 2008: n.p.). The 2011 plan to establish SOCA’s successor, the 
National Crime Agency, only speaks more loosely of developing a “national intelligence 
picture” that “will make available a consolidated and prioritised view of those causing harm 
to the UK” and a “prioritisation of harm and impact” (Home Office, 2011: 14) 
Another possible reason for abandoning SOCA’s ambitious and timely project is that the 
thorough and unprejudiced assessment of the harms associated with different criminal 
                                                          
2
 Mackenzie and Hamilton-Smith (2011) discuss some of the difficulties encountered by SOCA in 
implementing a harm-based approach. 
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activities in Europe might produce some unpleasant surprises for policy-makers, as the 
above-mentioned examples of drug trafficking and human smuggling suggest. Namely, these 
empirical assessments might give policy-makers the evidence that the harms associated with 
activities they have until then prioritized are lower than commonly assumed and/or are 
primarily the results of policy decisions and interventions, thus suggesting that policy goals 
and/or interventions have to be profoundly revised. 
Hopefully, EU policy-makers will not be discouraged by the many conceptual and 
methodological difficulties of assessing harms and by the risk of finding out what they did 
not want to see. For inspiration, they should look at the policy principles of one of the EU 
MS, Finland. Since the 1970s, in fact, the main goal of Finnish penal policies has been 
twofold:  “(1) the minimization of the costs and harmful effects of crime and crime control  
and (2) the fair distribution of these costs among the offender, society and the victim” 
(Lappi-Seppäla, 2012). These aims would also be worth of the whole European Union, as this  
regards itself as a worldwide champion of human rights. And deeds—in this case, adequate 
analyses, policy choices and interventions—should follow words. 
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